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Abstract
This article explores the thesis that we are at a time of historical inflection and suggests what
next steps might look like. The change in the seat of authority from the sixteenth century on
with the replacement of political and religious hierarchies by participatory democracy and
Enlightenment philosophies based on rationalism has seen a remarkable period of progress in
science, technology, education, medicine, governance, trade, economics, and the rule of law.
The twenty-first century, however, has ushered in a series of reversals for liberal democracy,
the fraying of the international rules-based order that emerged after the two world wars and a
collapse of public confidence in the institutions and methods based on the rationalist approach.
The article suggests that the old forms are dissolving and that the time has come for the
emergence of a new paradigm and proposes that three developments may point toward the next
evolutionary way station: the emergence of complexity science, an appreciation that our
emotions are a positive evolutionary advantage rather than a flaw to be overcome, and a focus
on relationships rather than simply on individuals.
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developed from a lecture first given at the Annual Conference of the Centre for the Resolution of Intractable
Conflict in September 2017.
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Liberals

and progressives, no less than the population at large, have in recent times been
experiencing a roller coaster of expectations, emotions, and reactions to challenging political
developments, both national and global. Most people who grew up in Europe and in the United
States in the past two or three generations were used to a postwar world on a continuous
trajectory of economic improvement, physical security, and increasing freedom and
democracy. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, they were joined by
the citizens of states from the old Soviet bloc, South Asia, Latin America, and parts of Africa,
which were also becoming more democratic, stable, prosperous, peaceful, and relatively free.
It seemed that we might be moving into a new era, characterized by the more rational conduct
of global affairs and where people were protected by the adoption and implementation of
human rights instruments governing not only civil and political affairs but social and economic
development too. Liberal democracy and the capitalist economic model seemed to have won
the day, demonstrating and affirming the validity of the principles that had emerged from the
Enlightenment. Not everyone went quite as far as Francis Fukuyama, who argued that the
global spread of liberal democracy and free market capitalism may signal the end point of
humanity’s sociocultural evolution and be the ultimate form of human government.1 Many
certainly believed, however, that we were far along a linear process of evolutionary
development and that progress is based on human reason.
There had been earlier shocks to this optimistic interpretation of history and its trajectory,
notably the two global conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century. The involvement of
Germany in the prosecution of war, and more especially in the Holocaust, despite its impressive
educational system and its history of thought and culture, was especially troubling. Germans
had been important contributors to the political and intellectual liberalism and rationalism that
emerged in previous centuries through the Reformation and the Enlightenment. Faith in human
reason had led to extraordinary progress in science and technology and would continue to do
so, not least in medicine, transport, and communication; but that confidence had experienced a
profound setback. Enlightenment thinkers had expected that a few generations of popular
literacy and rational education would be sufficient to curb human aggression and violence and
would ensure the peaceful and stable progress of humanity. The First World War put a serious
question mark against those optimistic assumptions. Sigmund Freud, who described himself as
“a liberal of the old school,”2 was so affected by the terrible events of the war that he
dramatically altered his theoretical model, introducing the notion of the death instinct and
responding in a rather pessimistic way to Albert Einstein’s invitation to suggest ways of
preventing future wars.3
Initially most political observers hoped that the problems that had led to Germany’s
engaging in such destruction could be addressed by the application of more democratic
principles. If human rationality had not contained human aggression, surely it was a problem
of the old imperial order, and new national democratic constitutions along with institutions of
international cooperation would prevent a recurrence. The application of human rationality to
governance in Germany’s new Weimar Republic, however, and international cooperation
through the League of Nations did not resolve the problem, and despite improvements in the
management and infrastructure of Germany, inflation grew to catastrophic levels and was
accompanied by a rise in political extremism that resulted in a second and in some ways even
more appalling and widespread global conflict.
As the Second World War came to a close, leading figures in Europe and the United States
were forced to recognize that education and rationality applied to socioeconomic and political
development had not prevented the disastrous violence of two world wars, and so they proposed
a more robust international rules-based approach in the hope that it might succeed.
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The League of Nations was replaced by the United Nations, bringing countries together
around the table but with a special role for the victorious powers in its central governing body,
the United Nations Security Council. The creation of the Bretton Woods institutions addressed
the economic challenges that had been held responsible for at least some of the interwar
instability. The purpose of the Nuremberg trials was not only to allow the vengeance of the
victors but also to make clear that there would in the future be no impunity for “crimes against
humanity” that were not excusable even in times of all-out war. And more important, a new
secular code of global “commandments” was set out in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR). The thirty articles of the declaration start with a statement of belief in Article
1 that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,” followed by the
insistence that “they are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood.” But the UDHR recognizes that the freedom and dignity that
every individual should be able to enjoy depends on human rationality and on conscience and
a spirit of brotherhood. That moral imperative and fraternal spirit had failed in Europe for a
catastrophic second time in less than a generation. It was becoming clear that the human rights
that had been declared by the humanists and liberals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
could not be guaranteed merely by an appeal to a rational moral conscience. So the UDHR,
adopted by the United Nations in 1948, was imbedded in an international rules–based system
with new international institutions that it was hoped would ensure its full implementation.4
The decades that followed gave some grounds for optimism that humanity had learned its
lesson and that a new age had begun, guided by universal values that went beyond religion,
nationality, politics, and culture. The hope was that this new body of international law based
on human rights and grounded in postwar multinational institutions would ensure the
development of a global culture of lawfulness. International courts began to hold to account
those found guilty of crimes against humanity. Countries that had been former enemies over
many centuries came together, first in Europe and then in other regions, to form transnational
unions cooperating on economic, legal, cultural, scientific, and political challenges, as well as
the emerging global threats to health and the environment. Real progress was made on tackling
infectious diseases and reducing poverty and hunger. The end of the Cold War saw serious
efforts to reduce the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and limit their further proliferation to new
states. To some, especially liberals in the West, it really began to look as though a new golden
age was dawning.
It was therefore a profound shock for many people to see all this change in recent years
with the rise of transnational terrorism, religious fundamentalism, extreme nationalism, and a
slide into deepening racial and ethnic divisions and violent political conflict throughout the
world. Questions about what creates and sustains intractable violent political conflict and how
it may be possible to find ways out of it returned with an urgency not seen for decades.
Prosperity was replaced by austerity and for the first time a generation of young people had to
adjust to the expectation that they would likely have a lower standard of living than their
parents. Every previous generation had expected to build on the success of those who went
before, but now many young people would struggle to own their own homes, and almost all
would have to work longer before retiring with lower pensions. This generation in most
countries around the world are less confident than their parents were about the adequacy and
quality of the public provision of education, health care, and social care. Pollution, catastrophic
climate change, and other environmental threats are on the rise, and the high hopes for a new
world order after the end of the Cold War have given way to profound anxiety with the rise of
Islamist and white right extremism and terrorist attacks. The security responses of the “War on
Terror” have not resulted in a more stable world, and instead we have an increasing number of
fragile or failing states. The new models of international cooperation at a regional level, most
notably the postwar European Project, seem to be struggling against a public mood of
3
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skepticism and even disenchantment. The departure of the United Kingdom from the European
Union after almost half a century of membership is an important example of how decades of
expansion of liberal democracy have given way to political fragmentation and the return of
populism and nationalism in Europe. But this drift is mirrored on every other continent too,
and liberals are deeply anxious about it.5
Faced with such reversals of fortune, many liberals who would normally try to reflect with
some objectivity on the root causes of political challenges find themselves, like everyone else,
driven by feelings of fear and anger, becoming intolerant of different perspectives and blaming
those with whom they disagree for being responsible for these disappointing and frightening
changes. What many of my colleagues do not see is that by conducting the debate in somewhat
belligerent tones, they are contributing to the polarization and profound partisanship that now
deform our political discourse rather than promoting reflection, conversation, and inclusive
engagement of the whole community in understanding our dilemmas and how they can be
addressed in new ways.
Under such pressures, the natural human response is to turn inward and focus on one’s
own domestic circumstances, so, for example, Democrats (and some Republicans) in the
United States, distressed by the 2016 election and subsequent performance of President Donald
Trump, focused on him and the methods that his campaign (and some external players)
employed to get him elected and on how close or unrepresentative that election result actually
was. They concentrated, successfully, on ensuring that he was not re-elected in 2020, but the
result was not an overwhelming victory; instead, it demonstrated that the United States, like so
many other liberal democracies, is split down the middle and the questions must still be asked,
“What has happened to cause such a large percentage of white Americans to turn away from
the Democratic offer and vote for such a person? How can it be that liberal democracy can
result in such an outcome when people know with great clarity what they are voting for?” The
psychoanalyst Ed Shapiro in a recent book says that the lesson he has learned from a lifetime
of engaging with such issues is that he needs always to ask the question, “What is the other guy
right about?”6
This, however, is not just an American problem. We must reflect on the fact that similar
swings of fortune are seen in almost every part of the world, with populists, demagogues, and
nationalists rising to prominence almost everywhere. Unlike a previous generation of leaders
such as Mikhail Gorbachev, Nelson Mandela, F. W. de Klerk, Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin,
Bill Clinton, and George Mitchell, who believed that the job of a statesman was to resolve
conflicts, today’s leaders look for greatness in conducting conflicts, domestically and
internationally. Whatever has occasioned this change in the global community, it is not merely
about the conduct of politics in one jurisdiction. There is a worldwide shift. People of every
age and stage also seem to feel increasingly distant and alienated from all institutions of
governance—whether national government, regional structures such as in the European Union,
or the postwar international rules-based order as represented by the United Nations, the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the World Health
Organization. The legitimacy of these structures is questioned, and one hears constant
complaints that they are not operating in the interests of ordinary people and that they are
ineffective, not only taking military actions under dubious mandates but unable to justify them
by subsequently bringing these interventions to a satisfactory conclusion—one of the
requirements of the doctrine of the “just war.” The wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria
have resulted in widespread chaos and lawlessness that is also reaching beyond the borders of
these failing states, with enormous costs in the destruction of life and property and with no
successful end in sight.
There is also anger about what is perceived as gross inequity and corruption in the financial
system. The assumption, and the promise, that abandoning socialism and adopting liberal
4
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economic models would bring prosperity to all now seems like a bad joke to many who lost
their jobs and livelihoods in the financial crises, especially when they see that those in the
banking and finance industry who were responsible for the economic collapse got off lightly
and, in some cases, even prospered from their unethical irresponsibility.
This loss of faith in the authorities and trust in their expertise applies not just to politicians
and government, bankers, and financiers but to many kinds of scientific, technical, academic,
and educational experts and authorities. While the COVID-19 pandemic has swept across the
globe and the only hope of limiting its catastrophic impact is through the guidance of
epidemiologists and the remarkable research successes of those who produce vaccines and
identify treatments, those groups of people who express their lack of trust in other authorities
also refuse to wear masks and observe physical distancing, they are skeptical and even
antagonistic to vaccination, and conspiracy theories run wild through their social networks.
With trust in experts and elites gone, people have also found similar betrayals in those
areas of social engagement with which they most easily identify, such as popular sports like
football, and institutions that normally provide some of the social glue that keeps societies
together in difficult times, including the churches and other religious organizations, have been
exposed as infested with dishonesty, corruption, and the abuse of children and young people.
Confidence in all these traditional structures and their leaderships is at a very low ebb and
people are turning in large numbers to movements and leaders who express the anger and
betrayal that they feel so strongly. It does not matter whether they believe all that such groups
and leaders say. They do not necessarily read their manifestos and find themselves persuaded
of new political theories. What appeals to them is that these leaders in their very personalities
express the feelings of anger and betrayal with which many people identify strongly. There is
a growth in nationalism and populism and an angry intolerance of difference that is now
expressed by liberals almost as much as by conservatives. This development raises a question
about whether it is in the nature of liberalism not to address anxiety, mistrust, and the negative
emotions that people feel because it is such a rationalist philosophy, and so its failure when
faced with such a picture is inevitable. This is an important question and I return to it later.
What is clear is that the leaders of the old order, liberal and conservative, have lost confidence
that they themselves really know how to address the challenges they face, and those who
represent the expertise in governance, finance, science, and technology that has delivered
extraordinary benefits in increased international trade and travel and huge progress in medicine,
communication, and information technology have now lost much of the earlier, and justifiable,
popular respect and trust in their integrity and judgment.
Recent technological developments are often described as “disruptive.” For some this
word has positive connotations, suggesting interruptions in the status quo and the opening up
of new opportunities for change, while for others, possibly a majority, the welcome they give
to particular new technologies, such as “smartphones,” is not reflected in an enthusiasm for all
aspects of the new technology and its complicated personal, social, and ethical implications.
When we are faced with such crisis and uncertainty, our natural reaction is to look to the
experience of the past to see whether we can identify previous patterns that, while not repeated
precisely, may nevertheless give us guidance. Some thinkers, troubled by the rise in political
extremism, see resonances with the rise of fascism in the 1930s following on from the impact
of the First World War, the influenza pandemic of 1918–1920, and later the Great Depression.
They identify the financial and economic crises of 2008 as a trigger for the regression from
liberal democracy to populism and authoritarianism. Other commentators see analogous
developments in earlier periods or emphasize other drivers for their analyses.
In trying to understand the dynamics of what has come to be called Brexit—the decision
by the United Kingdom to disengage from the European Union—I have been reflecting on how
we had a kind of Brexit five hundred years earlier when Henry VIII broke the link between the
5
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English Church and the rest of the Roman Catholic communion. At that time Europe was
experiencing crises that had some characteristics similar to those of today. Among these was
profound disenchantment with the Roman Catholic authorities that exerted control over the
population in religious affairs (and there were no other substantial churches or religious
authorities in the West) and in much of the secular world too. In 1517 a German monk called
Martin Luther, believing that the Church leaders were corrupt, dishonest, misleading people
about their faith, and untrustworthy on key issues of public and private life, issued a challenge
in the form of ninety-five theses. Not only, however, did his theology challenge the authority
of the Pope and the Church by its insistence on the priesthood of all believers and the
responsibility of everyone to read the Bible and work out their own faith and relationship with
God, but he followed it up by translating the Bible into the German vernacular. Because
printing had become widely available with Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press in the
mid-1400s, the content of Luther’s ideas and the Bible itself were now quickly available to
large numbers of people in their own language. What was true for German speakers soon
became true for others, with the result that right across Europe a ferment of ideas was generated,
resulting in a fundamental shift of authority. Gutenberg’s new “disruptive” technology was
first used for the printing of indulgences for the Church and the printing of the Bible in Latin—
a language that was not understood by many religious at the time, never mind the ordinary
people. It was not long, however, before printing began to make the ideas of Luther, Calvin,
and other reformers available for people to read for themselves, and the arguments became
fierce about theology, liturgy, and church government and practices and also about the standing
of the secular authorities. Soon the seat of authority in both faith and politics no longer lay with
the bishops and princes who could no longer insist that they had the monopoly of interpretation
of the world or the instruction of people on how life should be lived. In principle at least, every
man had the freedom, the facility, and the responsibility to read and interpret the scriptures and
an increasing amount of other literature for himself—though this freedom was not quite as
complete as it was often declared to be. Coming at a time when there was profound unhappiness
about corruption in the Church and frustration at religious and political authoritarianism,
Luther’s intervention was like a spark to tinder.
Today we do not think of printing as a “disruptive technology”; but in those days many of
the bulwarks of society must have sat around their dinner tables discussing the profound
dangers of this invention. They knew that people would develop all sorts of new ideas and the
old certainties and the very stability of society were under threat. They were right to be
concerned. The result of this disruption was violent conflict and an end of their position of
unquestioned authority. Similarly, as we look around today, we see that new disruptive
technologies abound; deep anger about the corruption seems endemic in authorities of all kinds,
and they have lost the respect of their people. The result is political fragmentation. If we look
back at what happened five hundred years ago, can we learn anything? What are the similarities
and differences?
In the first instance, men of science (and they were almost all men) like Galileo, Descartes,
and Newton did not challenge specifically religious doctrine, but their observations
emboldened them to question what the Church was teaching about the universe we inhabit.
While some were able to avoid sanctions by the Church because of where they lived, others
had a much more difficult time; but their healthy intellectual curiosity ensured that rather than
simply accepting the traditional teachings of the Church about the world, they continued to
explore it for themselves.
Galileo Galilei was not only an acute observer; he also developed the use of instruments
such as the telescope to improve the quality of his observations and conducted experiments to
see whether his thinking and his mathematical calculations were borne out in practice. The
thinking based on these experiments got him into trouble with the Church in his home country
6
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of Italy because his results challenged the received Church wisdom, especially in the field of
astronomy, where, among other things, in his book Sidereus Nuncius (Starry Messenger),
published in 1610, he put forward the proposition that the earth goes around the sun, rather
than that the sun goes around the earth. The Polish polyglot Copernicus had already expressed
this view but had died shortly after the publication of his book De revolutionibus orbium
coelestium (On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres) in 1543.7
While Copernicus and Galileo were forced by their scientific observations and
mathematical calculations to question the Church’s beliefs about the natural world, the
Frenchman René Descartes, in his Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's
Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences (1637), ventured into even more challenging
territory. The Protestant Reformation had fundamentally altered the seat of authority.
According to the reformers, every individual had the right and the responsibility to work
matters out for themselves and Descartes was able to find freedom to develop his philosophical
ideas by moving to the relative openness of the Protestant Netherlands, though even there his
commitment to a rationalist approach to enquiry rather than accepting religious dogma led him
into disputes with some of the Protestant theologians. He was determined not to appeal to God
as the final cause for everything but instead he would “divide all the difficulties under
examination into as many parts as possible, and as many as were required to solve them in the
best way” and “conduct [his] thoughts in a given order, beginning with the simplest and most
easily understood object, and gradually ascending, as it were step by step, to the knowledge of
the most complex.”
This mode of examination was applied to the mind and the body, to the mental and physical
worlds, with both available for scientific exploration, though in different spheres. This
separation of the two spheres enabled him and others to make enormous progress in
understanding the physical world. His mathematical inquiries tended to reduce the higher and
more complex phenomena to their constituent parts, without entirely appreciating what was
lost in this reductionism. In exploring mental functioning, he also believed that the brain
resembled a working machine and that mathematics and mechanics could explain the most
complicated processes of the mind. By making this spilt between mind and body, he was able
to move ahead while retaining a religious perspective.
Isaac Newton, the greatest of the English scientists, took a similar approach. “Nature is
extremely simple and conformable to herself,” Newton said. “Whatever reasoning holds for
greater motions should hold for lesser ones as well.” In other words, he too seemed to believe
that we can separate phenomena into their fundamental elements and so build up a complete
understanding of the physical universe. It appears that having said that, he did understand that
something else was going on. “I can calculate the motion of heavenly bodies, but not the
madness of people,” he said, and he also conducted an extensive study of alchemy, presumably
from an instinctive appreciation of the limits of the explanatory models with which he was
working. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, some physicists who had continued
to build on Newton’s scientific ideas were beginning to think that they had identified all the
key laws and that, while there were still details to be worked out, the main principles were
clear.
Others were not convinced and things began to change quite dramatically in the early
twentieth century, not least when in 1927 Werner Heisenberg made clear that absolute accuracy
about some things simply wasn’t possible not just in practice because of the state of knowledge
or technology but in principle because, as he said, “One cannot measure the exact values of the
position and momentum of a particle at the same time.”8
It was becoming apparent that in chaotic systems, even miniscule differences in
measurements of initial position and momentum could result in huge errors of long-term
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predictions of these quantities—there was sensitive dependency on initial conditions and in a
very fundamental way a degree of uncertainty that could not be removed.
These developments in mathematics and physics linked up with politics, because
eventually a significant development in one area of intellectual life affects all other areas and,
more immediately, because governments were struggling even more than previously with the
violent political conflict that was convulsing the world and they turned to scientists to apply
their scientific understandings to the technology of warfare. Dramatic new opportunities for
communication had been developed by Guglielmo Marconi, Samuel B. Morse, Alexander
Graham Bell, and others, enabling messages to be communicated almost instantaneously across
huge distances. At the same time, powered flight and new types of military vehicles, such as
the tank, transformed warfare by bringing a step change in the destructive capacities and
geographical range of operations. The race to be the first in the development of new
technologies of warfare was mirrored by developments in civilian life with medicine, travel,
communication, lifestyle, and political ideas all being hugely affected by the application of
science.
The scientific method was more difficult to apply to biology and the development of
humanity; but with the evolutionary ideas of Darwin and the notion that we can break things
down into their component parts and understand those, some scientists began to think of human
relationships as being able to be reduced to an almost mechanical understanding of basic human
functions, such as nourishment, sexuality, and aggression. Later generations continued to
follow this reductionistic line, with people like Richard Dawkins seeing humanity as little more
than what he described as “throwaway survival kits for genes.”9 It should not be surprising that
the dissolution of boundaries and value systems was unsteadying.
Others wondered, however, about the limitations of reductionism and linear thinking.
Rather than reducing everything to its simplest elements, John Hughlings Jackson, the father
of English neurology, looked through the telescope from the opposite end and pointed out that
in human beings, individual maturation and development involves the emergence of new
capacities. As reflexes are replaced by voluntary movements, there is increasing flexibility,
adaptability, and complexity but by dint of that, less predictability. When that development is
obstructed by illness or injury, the newer, higher, more adaptable functions are lost and the
older more predictable, less complex functions return; but a natural process of healing then
enables some return of higher functions. In his Croonian lectures in 1884, he applied these
ideas of evolution and dissolution of the nervous system to physical development and to
“mentation,” or the thinking function, and even described these as an analogy to governance,
or the functioning of societies.10 His ideas were the basis for much of the approach that
Sigmund Freud took in the development of psychoanalytic theory. Freud was working at a
watershed period. Some of his thinking and that of his colleagues and successors tended to be
reductionistic, describing our higher functions in somewhat hydraulic or mechanistic terms. At
other times he seemed to suggest that the primitive mechanisms are only a foundation on which
other more advanced defenses or transformations could build. At these times he seemed to be
more focused on the development of emergent functions than on reducing complexity to simple
functions. Another physician who tried with some success to recognize the emergence of new
and complex capacities was the French evolutionary psychiatrist Henry Ey. His “neoJacksonian” organo-dynamic theory tried to get over the Cartesian split between mind and body
by incorporating the existentialism of people like Martin Heidegger into his ideas of the
evolution and dissolution of personality and consciousness; his understanding of the latter was
influenced by Heidegger’s notion of “being-in-the-world.” Ey appreciated that something
radically new is created by the emergence of consciousness—the capacity to be aware of
oneself and create in one’s mind a kind of theater in which one can observe the world in fantasy.
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To concentrate on the building blocks that provide the foundations of brain function does not
enable us fully to understand this emergent phenomenon.11
In the field of psychology, it was becoming clear that exploring how the individual
functions requires an understanding of the larger and wider systems in which the individual
operates. The individual with an eating disorder, for example, could not be successfully treated
without taking the family into consideration and without bringing them into treatment in family
therapy. Physicists were finding something similar. They could understand everything about
hydrogen and everything about oxygen, but that understanding did not tell them what emergent
properties to expect when they were brought together as water. Examining an individual
molecule of water provided little understanding of the concept of “wetness.” Some of these
physicists working at Los Alamos, where “the Bomb” had been developed, started to take their
thinking about systems into exploring complex adaptive systems. With greater complexity,
new phenomena emerged through theoretical developments in higher mathematics that took
them beyond linear thinking and were confirmed in practice.
They set up a new center, the Santa Fe Institute, which became the world center for the
study of complexity science. The work there has clarified that in reductionism not only
structure and organization but information is lost. Breaking things down into their constituent
parts illuminates some things, but it can miss others. It may seem that we have strayed a long
way from the challenge of understanding the dangerous developments in our global village, so
let us return to see why these discoveries are relevant and important.
While the key events of today, the development of disruptive technologies, the appearance
of widespread corruption, the loss of respect for authority with resultant instability and violence
in society has some precedents in the 1500s, at that point the reformers had a very clear and
progressive agenda. They wanted to replace the authorities that were standing in the way of
intellectual development with a more liberal democratic order that would facilitate new, critical
ideas and thinking, scientific exploration of all kinds, and a new economic and political order
with new ways of creating and distributing wealth. It is more difficult to see what the reform
agenda is today, for those who have adopted “disruption” as their modus operandi. They seem
to believe that to destroy the current structures and elite will, in itself, bring about a better
future; but as René Girard points out, it may simply bring chaos and violence.12
My own experience of trying to resolve the apparently intractable problem of political
violence in Ireland and bring about a new and better future led to a very different perspective
from that of “the disruptors” in the terrorist organizations. After hundreds of years of attempts
by England to dominate Ireland, punctuated by recurrent violent rebellions, finally in 1921
most of the island succeeded in achieving independence. The reason this did not include the
whole island was that the people of Ireland were divided on the future they wanted to see. The
majority in the northern part of the island had a different sense of identity and allegiance from
the rest of the people of Ireland. They were pro-British and Protestant, and they wished to
remain part of the United Kingdom. A thirty-year terrorist campaign between 1967 and 1998
failed to break their spirit or disrupt the connection, and the violence was finally ended by the
historic Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. This agreement and the process that led to it were
unique because a long process of engagement was undertaken to bring the violence to a
permanent end through analyzing and exploring all the key sets of disturbed historic
relationships.
The foundation for this process was two-fold—first, the practical example of the European
project that enabled historic enemies, Germany and France, to find new and peaceful ways of
relating to each other, and second, the acceptance of the liberal pluralism best described by the
philosopher Isaiah Berlin. He maintained that since we have the possibility of choice and
different individuals and communities will have differing views about what is a good future, if
one side is not to be repressed and the other dominant, a pluralist outcome will be required.13
9
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For Protestant unionists, the clear wish was to remain within the United Kingdom, while
Catholic nationalists wanted to leave the United Kingdom. Whereas nationalist disruption
through a long-running terrorist campaign had failed to sufficiently disrupt the state, repression
of the nationalist aspiration by unionism had also proved to be impossible. The three key sets
of relationships that emerged from the initial explorations were between Protestant unionists
and Catholic nationalists in Northern Ireland, between the people in the North and the people
in the South, and between Britain and Ireland. Thus, a three-stranded process was created that
involved the relevant political representatives of these three sets of relationships and when an
agreement was reached, it addressed all three sets of relationships with interlocking institutions.
While one could address each set of relationships separately and one could explore the
various socioeconomic problems, and also policing and the administration of justice, political
identity and control, religious affiliation and culture, history and geography, none of these
issues on their own was an explanation for the intractability of the conflict, and any engagement
with one impacted the dynamics of all the others. All these relationships and issues had to be
addressed in the same process. This was a complex adaptive system in which every intervention
impacted every other element and any resolution had to engage the whole system. The
application of systems theory to psychological problems in the 1970s had resulted in the
development of new approaches to treatment, such as family therapy in which a whole family
group was brought into sessions at one time to address the network of relevant connections and
relationships, rather than only the individual identified patient. In an analogous way, when we
started to think about developing the Peace Process in Northern Ireland, we realized that we
needed to respect the importance of the complex system of historic relationships involving
Britain and Ireland and every section of the community had to be involved in negotiating the
agreement.
In the years after the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, problems arose every time one
or more of these relationships were taken for granted. The British-Irish Inter-Governmental
Conference that was to maintain and sustain the London-Dublin relationship did not meet at
the top level for a decade, and so when the issue of Brexit arose there was no working
relationship between the political leaderships of the British and Irish governments. The absence
of such a relationship not only created problems in Northern Ireland but also proved to be very
problematic for the British government in its attempts to negotiate a Brexit agreement with the
European Union and for the Irish government as it found its political and economic stability
under threat. The process of negotiating the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and the
problems that have arisen since are a demonstration of the centrality of relationships in such a
complex adaptive system. A mechanical device is designed, built, and operated, and, especially
if it is a complicated device with many parts, it may break down and it will not repair itself.
The offending piece must be repaired or replaced, and then the mechanism can return to its
previous way of operating. The mechanism is complicated, but it is not complex. Social
systems are complex. A malfunctioning part of a social system will trigger attempts in the
remaining parts of the system to continue functioning, though in a different way. This resilience
of social systems is an example of the self-organizing capacity of a complex adaptive system.14
The Irish experience also adopted what one might understand as complexity thinking in
understanding terrorism. When an “ordinary” crime is committed, the police and the justice
system attempt to gather evidence, identify a suspect, build their legal case, and prosecute the
individual or small group of individuals concerned. It is a linear process. The criminal
meantime, whose motivation is usually some form of personal gain, will try to hide his
involvement, and for him it is a disaster if he is caught and convicted. The terrorist, however,
is part of a larger cohort with an agenda that does not involve personal gain and the victim who
is attacked is not the target of their attack. Instead, the triangularity of the process is such that
they attack a victim and make public that it is they who have conducted the attack in order to
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undermine the government or responsible authorities, who are their real target. While they
know that they are breaking the law, they see their actions as justified by a higher morality
where they are defending the culture or identity of their people. Even their own survival is not
as important as the well-being of their cause for which they will make costly sacrifices.15 They
are prepared to kill and to die for the sake of the cause, and they do not regard their death in
the course of their terrorism as a catastrophe as long as the cause to which they are devoted
continues to progress. In such a situation the normal, linear, individualized legal process is of
limited value because dealing with an individual terrorist rarely has much impact unless that
person is a key leader, and even then, the group can often find a successor. Dealing with such
a problem involves understanding and addressing the cause for which a whole group or
community of people is prepared to fight and die, and so it is a systemic rather than an
individual or linear challenge. Terrorism, as described by Vamik Volkan, is not a matter of
individual psychopathology but a phenomenon of “large group psychology.”16
The same analysis can be applied to the terrorist violence of the radical Islamists and the
“alt-right,” extreme right, or white supremacist movements. They see themselves as fighting,
not on their own behalf but as part of a group or community that they believe to be under threat,
to have been treated unfairly, humiliated, and disrespected, and to have been unable
successfully to resolve these toxic experiences through peaceful democratic processes. They
are fully aware that their actions are seen under the law as criminal acts, but they believe
themselves to be serving a higher morality—the protection of their community from existential
threat. Even those who operate as “lone wolves” almost always identify with a larger group or
community. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) were extreme nationalists with a relatively
simple political agenda—independence and unity for Ireland—and this is also largely true of
some Islamist groups such as Hamas. Other more radical Islamists, such as Al Qaeda, the
Islamic State, and their various associated networks, are, like the white supremacists,
transnational networks with a wider and less specific agenda though driven by similar concerns
and emotions but arguably representing the more profound deterioration in the global system
to which I have referred. It is still true, however, that if we examine these terrorist phenomena
not as the actions of a large number of disconnected, self-aggrandizing criminal individuals or
small groups of discontented and disturbed people but rather as complex large group
phenomena, we might improve our understanding and effectiveness. In trying to understand
the functioning of a murmuration of starlings we do not seek to identify which is the leader for
we know that no such individual bird exists. These flocks of birds are not led by one or more
leaders, nor are they merely a collection of individual birds. They are functioning as a system.
Exploring networks of violent actors as large group phenomena, rather than the individual
actions of many troublesome individuals, would assist our analysis and help us understand
better how to address the problems. But the challenge of moving to a new and different
paradigm is significant.
First, it is not easy to maintain a new and nonpartisan way of thinking. I was struck by
how when the British prime minister Tony Blair, who had been deeply involved in the Irish
Peace Process (a process he did not create but inherited from his predecessor, John Major),
subsequently engaged in the Middle East problems with Israel and Palestine, he seemed to
entirely forget all the lessons learned about understanding the complex sets of historic
relationships involved. His behavior demonstrates the powerful tendency we have to regress to
previous ways of thinking and functioning when we move to a new problem, and especially
when we confront a challenging and polarized situation where the pressure to identify with one
side or the other is very strong. But once one starts to identify with one side or the other, one
has simply become part of the problem. The only way beyond this is to seek to understand the
problem as located not in the aims or actions of one or other side but in the disturbance of the
relationship between the two (or more) sides, now and in the past.
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In addition, though a shift of thinking and functioning is required, the social structures that
were constructed on the old way of operating will strongly resist any attempted shift. The
Reformation triggered the Counter-Reformation. Those who have benefited from or come to
power in the old system, or have simply become comfortable or used to it, will strongly and
often violently resist change. They will use every intellectual argument, economic pressure,
political hurdle, and religious, cultural, or legal obstacle to resist the change, and, of course, in
many instances this is not only psychologically understandable but perfectly reasonable for
those who will lose out as individuals or communities from the change.
Second, part of the complexity, and certainly a key element in relationships, is the affective
component. The Enlightenment focused on reason as the key to progress, and rationality
certainly has a primary role in our functioning as human beings. But we function as emotional
beings too. Goethe and others were quick to point out that how we think has affective and other
complex and nonrational components. Those who come from an Enlightenment perspective
have tended to regard “feelings” as failings to be overcome in the service of rationality; but it
is becoming increasingly clear that the nonrational components of our make-up have also been
essential to our evolutionary success as human beings. In his most recent book, on cognitive
biases in strategic instincts, Dominic Johnson sets out how cognitive biases can result not in
catastrophic defeats but in remarkable successes.17 He gives the example of George
Washington, who, on any objective evaluation of military strengths and weakness, ought to
have been soundly defeated but refused to accept setbacks and ultimately achieved a historic
victory and independence from Britain.
These observations by Johnson offer some profoundly important messages to progressive
thought and political liberalism. Successful ideologies and organizations, like complex
adaptive systems, survive because they can evolve and adapt. In a few short years we have
gone from Fukuyama and liberal democracy as the end of history to a widespread view that
history may be watching the beginning of the end of liberal democracy. This is evidenced by
opinion polls that show that increasing numbers of young people in the West are disenchanted
with democratic politics. Globally we see the rise of authoritarian leaders who intend to govern
for the foreseeable future without the inconvenience of free and fair elections and term limits.
Can liberalism evolve and adapt to this challenging political and cultural climate?
If we take seriously the increasing disenchantment with “expertise,” the loss of faith in
authorities and experts, and the rise of nationalism and populism; if we appreciate that there is
justifiable anger about widespread corruption and frustration with unfairness, broken promises,
and the undeliverable prospectus of equality; if we focus on fairness, cooperation, community,
and a radical new way of understanding based on complexity theories and science, will it bring
peace, stability, and prosperity? We cannot be sure; indeed, one of the key insights of
complexity science is that the resilience of systems brings outcomes that are not predictable.
In the short term, whatever we do, we may be facing profound disruption. But when individual
patients present with various pathological defenses, the psychological psychiatrist will not only
try to find the anxieties or other feelings that underly and lead to the disturbance of thinking
and behavior. He or she will also explore the key relationships of the patient and try to
understand how far the disturbances of the individual who has presented are a function of
systemic disturbances of the network of relationships of which they are “the presenting node.”
We live in an age of anxiety, but this is not just about my personal anxieties. Since the bombs
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we have all lived with unprecedented and growing threats to the
very survival of humanity because we now have the capacity to destroy all human life on the
planet. Two generations later we have additional well-founded public anxiety about threats to
the life we know from large and rapid changes in technology, rapid population movements and
consequent cultural pressures, and the existential threat of climate catastrophe. This anxiety,
which we all share, results in regression not only to the past but also to a fundamentalist way
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of thinking in the community as well as in individuals. There is also increasing anger about the
disrespect and unfairness that many people feel, and while anxiety may likely result in
regression in the form of thinking, extreme anger can result in violence if there is no peaceful
route to its resolution. Such dissolution of ordered relationships results in loss of complexity,
a return to the past, fusion with the group as opposed to the other, and thinking based on being
a “devoted actor” committed to a very different set of non-negotiable values that may involve
costly and even fatal sacrifices for ourselves and others.
Can we evolve and adapt in the face of such pressures, moving forward and pursuing a
more cooperative “way of being”?
The first step is to appreciate that liberalism must move beyond being concerned only
about individual liberty for some, rather than about freedom of choice for all—including those
with whom I disagree. This requires a pluralist form of governance not because every opinion
or choice is as good as any other but because I have no defense against the person who believes
that their truth can be imposed on me, if I act in that way toward them. If I am to be free to
make my choices, then I must be prepared to negotiate the creation of a society where those
who have a different perspective from me not only believe but also feel that they are being
taken seriously and treated fairly and respectfully, as individuals and as communities.
Liberalism is not just about liberty. It is also about liberality—a generosity of spirit that
empathizes with and is concerned for those who feel disadvantaged, left out, or marginalized.
This attitude, however, must be honest and believable. A prospectus that declares that everyone
is equal is simply not believable because it is manifestly clear that human beings are not equal
and will never be equal. Ensuring fairness is an entirely different and deliverable commitment,
and all the intractable conflicts that I have examined involve communities of people who feel
deeply disrespected and believe themselves to have been treated profoundly unfairly.
If we can expand our perspective beyond the “rational individual actor” to create caring
and cooperative “ways-of-being” in community without losing our concern for the individual,
to be informed by rationality but also by emotions, basing our understanding on external reality
but also appreciating wishes, fears, and creativity, appreciating the lessons of history and
understanding the complexity of “large group” relations, then we may be able to rebuild our
resilience as a human race.
The old forms are dissolving, and we must look to the emergence of a new paradigm.
Perhaps these three elements—the emergence of complexity science, the appreciation that our
emotions are a positive evolutionary advantage rather than a flaw to be overcome, and a focus
on the significance of relationships rather than simply on individuals themselves—may point
toward a path for survival and our next evolutionary way station. We cannot be sure that this
will be a successful way forward, but if we do not venture out, we will not find a new path.
Exploration requires that we make the dangerous journey and we will come at length to a
wholly new place only if we take the risk of leaving where we are, with all the risks that have
attended the explorer in every generation. We know that complexity makes for greater
unpredictability and while that itself produces anxiety, it seems it is also necessary if we are to
evolve and adapt to the uncertain future ahead.
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